there was another BGP route leak yesterday
originating from AS7219 (Tulix Systems, Inc) and propagated into the global routing table by AS1299 (Telia)
shame on Telia for not having proper route filtering established at the border between them and AS7219
somebody at Tulix made a mistake with their export filters (understanding, happens to the best of us) but as a transit provider, it is up to Telia to not let the mistakes of their customers affect the global routing situation
also technically, the leak originated from another of Tulix's ASes AS10990 which then sent it upstream to 7219 and and so forth
I posted basically what I just said about Telia on NANOG
Telia provided a statement on the leak from yesterday
"Tracing back the logs of the beforementioned BGP Filter Server, it becomes obvious that for this particular downstream the initiator of the provisioning had chosen to apply AS filtering over prefix filtering. Using this option is against the guidelines and only exist for legacy reasons. As such, the concrete action we admittedly should have taken earlier but will do immediately is removing this option completely."
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